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In this paper, I examine the relationship that exists between 
the private sector and political parties in Guatemala. I define the 
private sector as a group of business people—owners, sharehold-
ers, and business executives—who organize to promote and defend 
their economic activities. Compared to the private sectors of coun-
tries like Mexico and El Salvador, which have traditionally enjoyed 
strong links with a political party, such as Partido de Acción Nacio-
nal (PAN) and Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), the 
Guatemalan private sector has not united its e!orts behind an elec-
toral project. I address the following questions: why has the private 
sector in Guatemala not built strong links with a political party? In 
the absence of a political party, how does the private sector express 
their interests? What other mechanisms of political influence does 
the private sector use?
Private sector access to government policy and the lack of a 
strong representative political party system with an influential left-
ist organization are two factors that have contributed to the lack of 
private sector-political party linkage in Guatemala. "e private sec-
tor has unique access to government policy in economic and fiscal 
matters, often negotiating policies with the executive branch and 
holding roles within the executive cabinet at times. It is important 
to note that the Guatemalan private sector has had access primarily 
to the executive and not necessarily to the legislature. 
"e absence of a strong representative party system has also 
hindered the emergence of private sector-political party linkage in 
Guatemala. Politicians on the right and left alike have been un-
able to consolidate parties in Guatemala. Guatemalan parties are 
often built around the image of individual candidates, rather than 
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around durable platforms. Additionally, the left has been elector-
ally weak and has thus not posed a threat to the business sector in 
Guatemala. "e lack of e!ective representation in the party system 
has forced the business sector to rely on other organizations, such 
as the Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Fi-
nancial Associations (CACIF) as well as the Foundation for the 
Development of Guatemala (FUNDESA), to defend their inter-
ests. "e distance between the private sector and political parties 
in Guatemala emerges partly from the absence of a representative 
party system.
"e following section discusses the methodology employed. 
"is will be followed by a literature review that shows the dearth of 
scholarly work on Guatemala’s private sector. In the third section, 
I present a set of hypotheses derived from previous work done by 
scholars in comparative politics. In the fourth section, I present a 
historical analysis of the private sector, the state, and political par-
ties in Guatemala. I conclude by discussing potential implications 
of my findings for the study of private sectors and parties in Latin 
America, as well as directions for further research.  
METHODOLOGY
"is paper utilizes a qualitative approach to understand the 
private sector in Guatemala and why it has not given full support 
to a political party. Support, in this case, refers to actions such as 
campaign contributions, formal endorsement of a party and its po-
litical platform by businessmen and business associations, continu-
ous collaboration with a party in non-electoral years, and business 
membership in a party.  I provide a brief analysis of the pre-dem-
ocratic period (1944–1985) to demonstrate the relationship be-
tween the private sector, parties, and the state in a non-democratic 
context. My primary focus lies in the period from 1985–2012, as 
political parties have been more dominant in the wake of the return 
to democracy. I draw from diverse sources such as personal inter-
views with prominent private sector leaders in Guatemala across 
sectors such as industry, commerce, and agriculture. I also utilize 
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secondary sources that include interviews with private sector rep-
resentatives. Finally, I employ data from the Inforpress Central 
American Report from 2000–2012. 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE SECTORS AND POLITICAL 
PARTIES
Edward Gibson’s Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina 
in Comparative Perspective directly addresses the question of the 
private sector’s relationship with political parties. Gibson focuses 
on the case of Argentina and attempts to answer why no party has 
captured the upper-class constituency in Argentine society. He 
defines conservative parties as “parties that draw their core con-
stituencies from the upper strata of society.”2 For Gibson, there 
are two reasons why business sectors have not formed a political 
party.  First, the private sector in Argentina has been traditionally 
divided along a regional cleavage. Gibson argues that when cleav-
ages are national—rural versus urban, for example—conservative 
parties are more likely to exist. Second, he argues that the strength 
of the relationship between the private sector and the state deter-
mines the incentives for party formation. When the private sector 
has ensured its access to the state in terms of policy and influence, a 
political party is irrelevant to maintaining the private sector’s politi-
cal influence.
Gibson states that parties compete for the support of the 
upper classes. After Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983, 
many conservative parties have struggled to obtain the support of 
the Argentine business sectors, with only the Union del Centro 
Democrático (UCEDE) succeeding. "e major contribution of 
UCEDE was establishing a conservative ideology for Argentina. 
UCEDE successfully advanced the notion of economic liberalism 
in the political debate, despite not having explicit private sector 
support.  In Gibson’s view, the division of the private sector and its 
ability to influence government policy are the factors that explain 
why UCEDE did not become the representative of the private sec-
tor’s interests. 
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Although Gibson provides a detailed account of the UCEDE 
as a conservative party in Argentina, I do not interpret the UCEDE 
as a strong example of a linkage built between economic elites and 
political parties. As Gibson himself shows, the UCEDE later be-
came a catchall party that allied with the Peronists only for elector-
al gain. Furthermore, a decade after Gibson’s study, the Peronists 
dominated the party system in Argentina. Even the Radical Party, 
formerly the major opposition group, was weakened and su!ered 
major electoral losses. "us, Argentina is not a good case of con-
servative party formation, but rather a case that shows why private 
sectors fail to support political parties. 
Kevin Middlebrook takes a di!erent approach to studying 
conservative parties in Latin America, arguing that countries in 
which private sectors supported a political party experienced longer 
periods of democracy than those countries in which the economic 
elites engaged in politics directly.3 Countries like Chile, Colombia, 
and Venezuela have had strong conservative parties, while Argen-
tina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Peru have not. In order to explain this 
variation, Middlebrook makes a path dependency argument that 
looks at the original relationship between the Roman Catholic 
Church and the state. He argues that the struggles between these 
two entities generated partisan conflict that later influenced the de-
velopment of conservative parties. Although he shows that the ex-
istence of church-state conflict usually correlates with strong con-
servative parties, it can be argued that he does not prove any causal 
relation between the two. For example, his theoretical framework 
fails to explain why strong conservative parties in Venezuela virtu-
ally disappeared from politics during the last decade. In addition, 
he does not address why the ARENA party in El Salvador became 
stronger after the 1980s.  
Finally, other work has attempted to explain the existence of 
conservative parties in specific countries. Yemile Mizrahi’s work on 
the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) in Mexico shows the devel-
opment of this party and how the support of business sectors was 
key to defeat the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI).4 Juan 
Pablo Luna demonstrates how the Unión Democrática Independi-
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ente (UDI) in Chile was able to build a programmatic linkage with 
business sectors, while at the same time building a patronage-based 
linkage with the lower classes.5 Neither scholar, however, provides 
an overall theory for why private sectors get involved in a political 
platform in some cases and not in others. In this paper, I attempt 
to answer that question by analyzing the case of Guatemala, where 
the private sector has never built a permanent alliance with a single 
political party. 
UNDERSTANDING THE GUATEMALAN PRIVATE SECTOR
Most of the research done on the Guatemalan business sector 
has focused on intra-elite dynamics and their political influence, 
but nothing has been written about economic elites and political 
parties in Guatemala. "e analysis that comes closest to doing so 
was conducted by Rachel McCleary on the private sector’s role in 
returning Guatemala to democratic rule in 1993 after the auto-gol-
pe of the president Jorge Serrano Elias. McCleary argues that the 
private sector was a central player in the defense of democracy. Had 
the private sector not supported these e!orts in the struggle for 
democracy, the Serranazo would probably have succeeded.6 "e 
anthropologist Richard Adams, one of the first scholars to study 
the Guatemalan private sector, argues that from 1955 to 1966 the 
upper class, composed mainly of agrarian elites, predominated in 
Guatemala.7 "ey organized according to their economic activity 
to pressure the government. Adams shows that the Guatemalan 
business elite, although it has experienced internal conflicts from 
time to time, has remained largely united. Paul J. Dosal provides 
a history of the industrialist elite in Guatemala from 1871–1994. 
He shows that while the co!ee producers maintained their eco-
nomic power, it was the industrialists who took leadership of the 
group and pushed forth a modernizing progressive ideology, es-
pecially during the 1970s.8 Finally, Marta Casaus Arzú discusses 
the development of what she calls the “Guatemalan oligarchy” over 
time. She argues that the country’s economic elites expanded their 
spheres of influence through family ties.9
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Some contemporary work has also examined the role of the 
Guatemalan private sector after the peace agreements. Ulkire Jo-
ras looks at the influence of private sectors in solving violent con-
flicts. He takes Guatemala as a case study of a private sector that 
actively contributed to the peace accords of 1996. Joras argues that 
although the private sector was not fully supportive of the peace ac-
cords negotiations, it had an interest in ending the armed conflict. 
He further claims that the private sector was not satisfied with the 
outcome, but still welcomed the end of a three decade- long war in 
Guatemala.10 
As I have shown, the existing literature has done little analysis 
of the role of the private sector in electoral politics. In this paper, I 
examine how the private sector has interacted with political parties 
and explain why it has not become fully involved with a political 
platform. In the next section, I outline the hypotheses that aim to 
explain this phenomenon. 
Explanations for the lack of private sector party in Guatemala
"ere are a few arguments to explain the large variation in 
private sectors’ support for political parties in Latin America. 
However, from empirical observations, secondary sources, and in-
terviews I have drawn a set of potential explanations. First, I take 
into account Gibson’s two variables to explain the Argentine case: 
the fragmentation of the private sector and its relationship with the 
government. If Gibson’s research is applicable to other cases, then 
his variables should apply to the Guatemalan case. 
My other hypothesis comes from a common argument made 
by the business leaders interviewed. When asked why Guatemala’s 
private sector did not fully support a political party, even though 
private sectors in other countries like El Salvador did, many busi-
ness leaders responded that the threat posed by insurgency in Gua-
temala was less imminent to that in El Salvador11. In El Salvador, 
the businessmen could either support ARENA or lose the country 
to the guerillas. In Guatemala, the guerrillas had been defeated by 
the mid-1980s, and the war was not being fought in urban areas 
like Guatemala City.12
Certainly, the threat variable is a potential explanation for 
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the existence of a political party supported by the private sector 
in Guatemala, or any other Latin American country. Nevertheless, 
it is important to distinguish between the types of threat that the 
private sector faces. One class of threat constitutes a challenge of 
the basic foundations of a liberal society, such as the expropriation 
of private property. "is threat was posed in Guatemala by the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in an armed 
struggle that lasted from 1960 to 1996. "e other type of threat is 
less radical and is exposed by institutional leftist parties. "ese par-
ties might propose some measures such as land redistribution or 
increase in taxes, the creation of a welfare state, or nationalization 
of companies that the private sector might not support. Because 
these threats are di!erent, they produce di!erent responses. "us, 
my preliminary hypotheses are the following:
H1: the greater the fragmentation of the private sector, the 
less likely that the private sector as whole will support a political 
party. Conversely, the lower the fragmentation of the private sector, 
the more likely that they will become fully involved in their support 
for a political party.
H2: the more access and ability to influence policy the private 
sector has, the less likely that the private sector will support a po-
litical party.  On the other hand, the less access and influence, the 
more likely that the private sector will make e!orts to build a party. 
H3: when elites face a radical threat to private property out-
side the electoral system, the less likely that they will create a link-
age with a political party. In this case, they might invest resources 
in the armed struggle. On the other hand, when the threat comes 
from an institutionalized leftist party, the likelihood of investing in 
a right-wing party increases. 
Graph 1 shows a basic model of the relationship between the 
political system and the private sector’s support for parties. It is 
important to note that this model assumes that the existence of a 
programmatic leftist party will provoke the existence of a program-
matic right wing party, and vice versa.13 In other words, an insti-
tutionalized party system is necessary for the existence of a private 
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sector-political party linkage. 
In the following historical analysis, I show that access to the 
state policymaking and the lack of an institutionalized party sys-
tem are the variables that make the private sector unlikely to sup-
port a political party. In Guatemala, the private sector has histori-
cally had access to the executive, including cabinet members and 
ministries. Furthermore, because the party system has always been 
weak and fragmented, the private sector has not faced the threat 
of a leftist platform. Had a strong leftist party emerged after the 
return to democracy, the Guatemalan private sector might have 
supported the establishment of a conservative party in the country 
more intensely, thus contributing to the institutionalization of the 
party system.  Because the party system never institutionalized, the 
private sector has not built permanent linkages with any one par-
ticular party. I also find that while a radical threat promotes private 
sector collective action, as Slater points out, this collective action 
does not necessarily translate into support for a political party.14 
During the armed conflict, the private sector did not make alliances 
with parties, precisely because it had access to the executive. Finally, 
the Guatemalan private sector has been united when it comes to an 
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external threat and, as a result, has not endorsed a political party. 
Instead, CACIF became the institutional vehicle for representing 
private sector interests vis-à-vis other actors in Guatemalan soci-
ety.15 
1944–1984
Political instability predominated from 1944 to 1984. As a 
result, the relationship between the private sector and the govern-
ment was also unstable. While most rulers sought to obtain the 
favor of the private sector at the beginning of their mandate, the 
private sector-state relationship usually deteriorated quickly. Fur-
thermore, the private sector never trusted political parties. "e po-
litical parties in Guatemala were personalistic and lacked strong 
roots in society.  "is made the private sector seek a direct rela-
tionship with the state through the business associations that were 
created in this period.
Guatemala entered a period of democratization in 1944 that 
only lasted a decade. In 1954, a conservative movement led by Car-
los Castillo Armas overthrew Jacobo Arbenz, claiming that Arbenz 
was taking the country in a communist direction. From 1954 to 
1985, the political system was dominated mostly by the military. 
"ere were some political parties, but these were not representa-
tive of the population. Participation was restricted, and elections 
were in many cases fraudulent. In fact, parties like the National 
Democratic Movement, which ruled from 1954 to 1958, became 
corrupt and personalistic.16 "is made the private sector distrust-
ful of political parties in general. "e private sector came to dislike 
how parties and politics alike were viewed as means to move up in 
the social ladder.
"e inability of the private sector to find and trust a political 
party to represent its interests led to the creation of business orga-
nizations that would deal directly with the government. In 1957, 
CACIF was created as an umbrella organization for the di!erent 
chambers and business associations in Guatemala. CACIF was 
formed by the Chamber of Industry and the General Association 
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of Agriculturalists. Although CACIF dealt with problems a!ect-
ing the business sector as a whole, each economic group created its 
own association to deal with the government as well. "e e!ective-
ness of the business associations in dealing with government and 
the instability of the party system explain the Guatemalan busi-
ness sector’s lack of support for a political party during this period. 
In e!ect, with the Peralta government (1963–1966)’s ascension to 
power, Guatemala’s business elites led the economic policy of the 
government.
Despite the private sector’s strong relationship with Peralta, 
the military party—the Institutional Democratic Party (PID)—
failed to win the next election. A civilian, Julio Cesar Mendez Mon-
tenegro, became president of Guatemala from 1966 to 1970. He 
institutionalized the representation of the private sector in govern-
ment bodies. For instance, the council of the state now included 
one representative from each of the major economic sectors: agri-
culture, commerce, and finance. Montenegro expected to obtain the 
support of the private sector in exchange for his reforms. However, 
the private sector failed to support the president’s tax reform of 
1967.
"is period gave rise to the emergence of the National Lib-
eration Movement party in Guatemala, a conservative party with 
a strong anticommunist agenda. Although it was never able to 
govern by itself, the MLN did reach the presidency in 1970 in a 
coalition with the PID that supported Carlos Arana Osorio. "e 
MLN remained in the political system for almost three decades. 
Nevertheless, it was perceived as an exclusive party and was never 
able to capture the upper class or popular support. In the 1980s, 
the MLN would become a counterinsurgent group, leading attacks 
against communist organizations. Because business associations 
were more e!ective at representing their interests and as the MLN 
had a clear ideological bias, the private sector never supported the 
MLN. 17
When Carlos Arana came to power in 1970, the private sec-
tor began to lose influence. Arana pursued a more state-led devel-
opment project.18 Furthermore, the private sector su!ered from 
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two economic shocks in the 1970s—the collapse of the Central 
American Common Market, which had benefited industrialists in 
the Central American countries, and the oil embargo of 1973. As 
a result of these events, the private sector embraced an economic 
model based on limited government spending and tax reductions. 
In this period, the industrialists began to understand the advan-
tages of free trade, while the agriculturalists wanted to maintain 
protectionist economic policies. Despite this lack of understand-
ing, the business sector was still able to maintain its representation 
within the military regime. Certainly, political parties remained out 
of the picture at this time.
"e relationship became more complicated in the 1980s, with 
the ascension of Lucas Garcia to the presidency. During Lucas’s 
presidency, repression of the insurgency and prominent political 
figures reached alarming levels. "e private sector began to be less 
supportive of the regime’s actions. Even the United States with-
drew its support for the Guatemalan army. Lucas’s inability to rule 
Guatemala led to a military coup that removed him from o#ce.
Rios Montt, Lucas Garcia’s successor, initially had the sup-
port of the private sector. He promised to cut government spend-
ing and address corruption. With the creation of the Council of the 
State (1982), the private sector obtained direct access to govern-
ment. Each economic sector had a representative.19 "e conflict 
between Rios Montt and the private sector began when the presi-
dent threatened to expropriate private sector land and intensified 
when Rios Montt gave a controversial radio address drawing on 
evangelical themes, angering many business elites, many of whom 
were Catholic.20 Rios Montt’s antagonistic relationship with the 
private sector and his military colleagues provoked his removal 
from o#ce in 1983. 
Rios Montt’s successor, Oscar Mejia Victores, tried to rees-
tablish the relationship with the private sector, decreasing the VAT 
from 10 to 7 percent. Under his rule, a new constitution was draft-
ed, which established that Congress, not the executive, would im-
pose taxes, and that business associations had the right to appeal to 
the Constitutional Court when taxes were not fair. "is law meant 
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that the private sector would now have to deal with Congress in 
order to advance its interests, rather than the president, who the 
private sector had historically had access to. On the other hand, the 
new option to appeal unfair tax rates gave the private sector new 
leverage.
International pressures for democratization as well as pres-
sures to open the economy led the private sector to endorse the 
democratic project of the mid-1980s. "is did not mean, how-
ever, that the private sector became more involved with political 
parties. Many in the private sector believed the democratic experi-
ment would fail again and, indeed, the political parties of the time 
did fail to deepen their organizational strength and leadership in 
Guatemalan society. "e number of parties increased rapidly and 
the system continued to be fragmented and volatile (see Tables 2 
and 3). "e private sector continued working through CACIF and 
also created a new think tank, the Foundation for the Develop-
ment of Guatemala (FUNDESA), similar to the FUSADES of 
El Salvador.21  Since 2003, FUNDESA has organized the Na-
tional Summit of Businessmen (ENADE), where private sector 
leaders discuss issues such as security and economic growth. "ese 
discussions serve as the basis for the foundation’s policy propos-
als. FUNDESA has two o#ces in the United States (in Miami 
and New Orleans) that serve as conduits for U.S. investment in 
Guatemala. CACIF and FUNDESA continue to function as the 
institutional vehicles through which the private sector expresses its 
political interests. 
1985-2011: "e transition toward democracy
"e 1980s were a time of economic crisis and international 
pressures for democratization. "e Guatemalan military accepted 
a transition towards a democratic regime although they it in charge 
of the transition. Opportunities for political participation emerged, 
with free and fair elections held and new political parties appearing 
on the scene. However, the private sector’s distrust of political par-
ties would continue. "e party system remained fragmented and its 
roots in society were non-existent. In this context, the Guatema-
lan private sector maintained its traditional channels of influence 
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through business organizations and cabinet appointments. As with 
the military regimes, the relationship between the private sector 
and the presidents deteriorated as the latter started passing reforms 
that a!ected them directly. 
By 1985 it was clear that the most powerful groups within 
the private sector—industry, commerce, and finance—had adopt-
ed a neoliberal agenda.22 When Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian 
Democrat Party of Guatemala (DCG) became president, the pri-
vate sector became concerned about the prospects of a communist 
party gaining strength in Guatemala.23 "e Guatemalan private 
sector was distrustful of Cerezo and his party after the events in 
El Salvador, in which the Christian Democrats passed agrarian re-
forms and nationalized the banking system. Cerezo, a skilled politi-
cian, reassured the private sector that he would not attempt to to 
pursue populist measures. Although the composition of Cerezo’s 
cabinet was not negotiated with the private sector, some members 
of the private sector were included. For example, businessman Ro-
dolfo Paiz Andrade became minister of finance,24 while Eduardo 
Goizueta, another businessman, became minister of infrastructure, 
and Federico Linares, member of the Associations of Banks, be-
came president of the central bank. In 1986, Cerezo organized the 
Concertacion Nacional, intended to be a mechanism for dialogue 
between the government and the private sector. "ese initial ges-
tures of openness gave Cerezo some support from the private sec-
tor during the first months of his mandate. 
But Cerezo too began to have conflicts with the private sec-
tor. CACIF made a public statement that while monetary stability, 
lowering inflation, and the liberalization of price controls in some 
products were positive measures that the government had achieved, 
it was concerned about the growing deficit, the proposal of tax re-
form, and the lack of action against the insurgency. Cerezo had ad-
opted “an active neutrality” with the guerrillas, trying to negotiate 
the end of the conflict between the army and the insurgency. "e 
private sector asked the government to define a well-structured 
economic plan, reduce the increasing size of the government, and 
take decisive action against the guerrillas.25 Despite the demands 
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of the private sector, Cerezo and his team, led by Paiz Andrade, 
sent the fiscal reform proposal to the Congress. 
"e fiscal reform of 1987 prompted a strong reaction from 
the private sector, with its members claiming that Cerezo had bro-
ken his promise that he would negotiate reforms with them. "ose 
cabinet members with ties to the private sector were against the 
reform, creating uncertainty within the private sector. Ultimately, 
the private sector did not continue negotiating.26
Instead, the private sector used its resources to respond to 
Cerezo’s proposal, calling publically for rejection of an increase in 
taxes, organizing a general strike, and utilizing the legal precedent 
established in the 1985 constitution to make an appeal to the Con-
stitutional Court to reject the new taxes. "e Court declared some 
articles of the law unconstitutional, especially the most controver-
sial. Finally, the private sector reduced its tax payments to the point 
that the fiscal burden for 1988 was only 8.1 percent. 27  
"e experience of the first democratic government illustrates 
the relatively low importance of political parties in Guatemala. "e 
private sector was united for the most part during this period and 
did not support a party. Rather, the private sector expended impor-
tant resources in expressing their discontent publicly through their 
umbrella organization, CACIF. Although the DCG initially had 
a majority in Congress, it lacked cohesion, su!ering from internal 
schisms that necessitated a search for coalition partners. "e lack 
of an electoral programmatic threat to the private sector was im-
portant in this period. Had the DCG been a more programmatic 
party, the private sector would have had to take their struggle to 
Congress, not to the streets. 
"e demise of the post-transition party system: Serrano as a 
political outsider and the 1993 crisis
Despite his political experience in the Rios Montt govern-
ment, where he served as president of the Council of the State 
(1982–1983), Jorge Serrano was a political outsider in the 1989 
elections. Serrano and his recently formed Movimiento de Acción 
Solidaria (MAS) surprised everyone in Guatemala with their vic-
tory. Because Serrano’s candidacy was improvised, he lacked a plan 
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to govern the country. He was certainly a neoliberal, but presented 
a weak leadership platform.
With MAS holding on 14 out of 116 seats in Congress, Ser-
rano needed alliances to be able to govern the country. He part-
nered with the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), as well as 
other small parties. He also formed alliances through cabinet ap-
pointments, appointing Alvaro Arzú, the secretary general of PAN, 
as minister of foreign relations. Furthermore, he invited members 
of the private sector to participate in his government. Richard 
Aitkenhead, a prominent member of the business sector, became 
minister of economy and then minister of finance, while Federico 
Linares was named the president of the central bank. With access 
to the new government’s fiscal and economic policy thus ensured, 
the private sector was satisfied with these appointments. 
In the first years of Serrano’s presidency, the private sector 
essentially set the government agenda. Its members hired Arnold 
Harberger of the University of Chicago to develop an economic 
program for 1991–1995. "is plan included stabilizing the econ-
omy, opening the Guatemalan market to foreign investment and 
trade, and modernizing the state. Serrano made this plan the core 
of his agenda, reinforcing his links with commercial elites. 
In contrast to his predecessor, Serrano did not experience 
open conflict with the private sector during the first years of his 
administration. His main obstacle to e!ective governance came 
from Congress. To win over supporters, Serrano resorted to infor-
mal negotiating mechanisms, such as paying bribes or handing out 
privileges to congressmen. 
Despite this, Serrano sought to curb the corruption that 
took place in Congress and weakened his e!orts at e!ective rule. 
On May 25, 1993, he announced the temporary suspension of the 
Constitution. Key democratic institutions such as Congress, the 
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Public Ministry, the 
O#ce of the Attorney General, and the O#ce of the Ombudsman 
for Human Rights were suspended. Serrano thought that the pri-
vate sector would join his cause against corruption in government. 
But the private sector united against Serrano’s self-coup, anticipat-
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ing that Guatemala would be isolated from international markets. 
"ey asked him to restore constitutional order, as his actions were 
harming the image of the country abroad.
"e international community, too, rejected Serrano’s coup, 
with the United States threatening to impose a trade embargo. 
"is threat to the private sector’s core interests became their central 
incentive to mobilize against Serrano. "ey played an important 
role in the formation of the Instancia Nacional de Consenso on 
May 30, 1993. "e Instancia gathered representatives of di!erent 
sectors of Guatemalan society ranging from business leaders and 
unions to universities and political parties.28 "e Instancia negoti-
ated a peaceful solution to the conflict, demanding Serrano’s resig-
nation and a return to the democratic order. Although the Instan-
cia involved many di!erent sectors of society, it was CACIF whose 
resources and organizational strength led the process.29
"e rejection of the coup by the private sector and the mili-
tary was central to the restoration of democracy in Guatemala. 
"ese two sets of actors, who had traditionally supported authori-
tarian forms of government, now supported democracy and the 
rule of law.30 Serrano resigned as president on June 1, 1993, and 
vice president Gustavo Espina took his place. When the private 
sector asked for Espina’s resignation, Congress elected Ramiro de 
Leon Carpio, the Human Rights Ombudsman, as the next presi-
dent. Carpio would remain in o#ce until 1996. 
"e events of Serrano’s short term in o#ce show the ability 
of the private sector to influence political processes in Guatemala. 
"ey also provide evidence of the weakness and corruption that 
dominated political parties at the time. Because of the fragmen-
tation of the political system, Serrano believed that Guatema-
lans would support an authoritarian government. He was proven 
wrong: Guatemalan society united against him, demanding res-
toration of the democratic order. Viewing political parties as the 
problem instead of the solution, the private sector shied away from 
making alliances with parties. Furthermore, they realized that in 
order to solve a crisis, they did not need links with a political party, 
and thus could continue relying on CACIF and other forms of as-
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sociation in times of political turmoil.  
A right wing party? "e failure in the consolidation of PAN
In 1995, Alvaro Arzú of PAN became president. Arzú, a 
businessman and former mayor of Guatemala City, relied heavily 
on urban support for carry his electoral victory. From an estab-
lished and wealthy family, Arzú had notable connections with the 
private sector. He had built a strong party with the support of the 
business leaders and filled his cabinet with businessmen (See table 
two). PAN won a majority in Congress, allowing it to pass a series 
of important neoliberal reforms, including the privatization of ma-
jor state companies. Because the private sector found Arzú an im-
portant government ally, CACIF’s level of mobilization decreased 
considerably. Private sector leaders shifted their focus to economic 
activities.31
Arzú received the private sector’s support during the majority 
of his administration. Even when he proposed minor changes to 
the tax system, CACIF collaborated because it had been included 
in the negotiation process in 1996.32 "ere was certainly some 
conflict in 1997, when a proposal to create a tax on property was 
rejected not only by the private sector, but also by popular organi-
zations. Because the tax was widely rejected, the Arzú administra-
tion had to suspend the measure in 1998. Another source of con-
flict was the alleged acts of corruption that took place during Arzú’s 
government.33 Although he was never charged, Arzú’s purported 
participation in corrupt practices damaged his government’s image. 
However, these conflicts took place against a broad backdrop of 
private sector support. 
During the Arzú government, the private sector maintained 
its pressure mechanisms through CACIF and its di!erent cham-
bers. After the signing of peace agreements in 1996, the private 
sector enjoyed the benefits of peace and the opening of markets. 
However, there was a sense that the government had lost in the 
negotiations against the guerrillas. "e peace agreements of 1996 
established a broad agenda for state action, goals that the private 
sector believed were unrealistic. Furthermore, some business lead-
ers feared that the left would pose a threat at the electoral level. "e 
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UNRG was being funded, organized, and trained by European na-
tions, particularly Norway. "is potential threat explains why the 
private sector started becoming more involved with political par-
ties, especially PAN, and also why the private sector became more 
active in its activities influencing policy. 
Despite its initial support of  PAN, the private sector real-
ized that the party was a platform based on the personality and 
image of Arzú.34 In the run-up to the 1999 elections, Arzú did not 
endorse the candidacy of his successor, Oscar Berger, and blocked 
the private sector’s membership in the party board. "ese attempts 
at controlling the party’s leadership failed: Arzú resigned from 
PAN. His unwillingness to endorse Oscar Berger contributed to 
the PAN’s defeat in the 1999 elections. Apart from the weakness 
of PAN as a political party, the private sector realized that the left 
would never able to build a strong political party, despite its initial 
fears of a leftist electoral threat in 1997. "is allowed the private 
sector to remain neutral in its relationships with parties, and con-
tinue pressuring through other means.
"e private sector and political parties after the Peace Agree-
ments
PAN was not able to win a second election in 2000, and the 
private sector has continued to eschew links with political par-
ties. "e poor electoral performance of leftist political parties par-
tially explains this lack of involvement. Despite the introduction 
of URNG as a political party, the left has not been able to pose 
a major threat to the private sector. In e!ect, the post-1996 party 
system became less ideological. New political parties have emerged 
in Guatemala, and parties such as DCG and UCN have gradu-
ally disappeared from the political arena. "e private sector is still 
represented by its business associations, which have confronted the 
government during the Alfonso Portillo (2000–2004) and Alvaro 
Colom (2008–2011) regimes. Although the private sector lost 
some of its access to the executive during these governments, it did 
not lose its influence over government policies. 
Portillo became president in 2000 and employed strong anti-
private sector rhetoric from the start. He claimed that the private 
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sector benefited from special privileges that needed to be eliminat-
ed. In February 2000, he announced a Q200 increase to the mini-
mum wage ($25). "is measure was not well received by the private 
sector, who argued that this would lead to higher unemployment 
and more poverty. "e measure established that the minimum 
wage would be increased every six months instead of annually. In 
May 2000, Portillo challenged the sugar producers, seeking to set a 
price ceiling on sugar. Because the producers did not comply with 
his demands, Portillo allowed the import of nearly 219,000 metric 
tons of sugar, which sugar producers claimed was almost half of the 
amount of sugar consumed nationally. "e sugar cartels organized 
through the Association of Sugar Producers of Guatemala and pro-
tested against the government. After some negotiations, producers 
agreed to a government settlement—the government would stop 
importing foreign sugar in exchange for producers lowering their 
prices. "is marked a major victory for the Portillo government. 
Portillo skillfully used confrontational rhetoric against the 
private sector. While Portillo appointed CACIF allies like Lizardo 
Sosa (central bank president) and Eduardo Weyman  (minister of 
economy) to his government, for the most part, private sector ac-
cess to the cabinet was restricted.  "e private sector maintained 
representation in state councils, such as the Minimum Wage Com-
mission, the Monetary Policy Board, and the Social Welfare Insti-
tute, but its influence of the private sector in politics was weakened 
overall. "is led to the redoubling of organizing through CACIF, 
the entity that would defend the interests of the business sector. 
Portillo also tried to reform Guatemala’s tax code, insisting 
that Guatemala needed to meet the 12 percent fiscal burden goal 
demanded by international organizations. "e private sector pro-
posed that this goal should be met only when the rate of economic 
growth reached 6 percent annually. "e government rejected this 
proposal, with Portillo proposing an increase of VAT from 10 to 
12 percent. In August 2001, Congress passed the tax reform plan, 
which included the 2 percent hike in VAT and new penalties for 
tax crimes. Claiming that the new plan negatively a!ected the in-
terests of the population, the private sector organized a one-day 
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strike. "e strike took place on August 1, 2001 with the support of 
popular organizations and students throughout the country. 
After the general strike of 2001, the relationship between 
Portillo and the private sector worsened, with the private sector 
complaining about government corruption. From 2002 onwards, 
the Portillo administration would be immersed in scandal after 
scandal. "e media was also critical of the government, which by 
the end of its first year had an approval of 36.3 percent of the popu-
lation35. Portillo was never able to recover his popularity, and his 
party lost in the next elections. 
Portillo had weakened the influence in government that the 
private sector enjoyed under previous presidents. However, even 
in this scenario, the private sector did not attempt to build an alli-
ance with a political party because they realized that the majority 
of threats to the private sector came from personalistic presidents. 
"ese presidents lacked strong partisan support, which implied 
that their proposals could be easily defeated. Furthermore, the 
front-runner candidates for president—Oscar Berger and Alvaro 
Colom—had deep ties to the private sector. Despite losing influ-
ence during the previous four years, the private sector felt assured 
that it would not face a major threat in the medium and long run. 
FRG had become isolated and fragmented after their time in gov-
ernment; thus, the lack of an institutional party that could pose a 
serious threat to the private sector is the major variable explaining 
why the private sector continued to be wary of linking with a po-
litical party. It had lost its historical access to government, but was 
able to maintain the status quo with the support of the business 
associations.  
"e weakness of the party system became an obstacle for ma-
jor reform in Guatemala.36 "e coalition that allowed Berger to 
become president did not last long. "ree parties—the Partido Pa-
triota, the National Solidarity Party, and the Reform Movement—
formed the new party Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA). Because 
of Berger’s links with the private sector, he received GANA’s sup-
port during the campaign. 
In contrast with Portillo, Oscar Berger had a healthy relation-
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ship with the private sector. Although his cabinet did not feature 
prominent private sector members, as Arzú’s had done, he main-
tained dialogue with the business sector. His major challenge came 
from opposition parties, which blocked any new legislation in con-
gress. Business leaders in Guatemala did not view Berger as acting 
like a statesman—his government was not able to communicate 
e!ectively with the population, something opposition parties were 
able to capitalize on in the next election. 37 "e electorate viewed 
Berger as a weak president, who did not address e!ectively the 
problem of security that was becoming a major issue for Guate-
malans. 
During Berger’s government, businessmen started investing 
more resources in public policy proposals. "e first National Sum-
mit of Businessmen (ENADE) was celebrated in 2003. From 2003 
to 2011, ENADE has drawn business leaders together to discuss 
and propose solutions to the major policy issues, emphasizing is-
sues such as international competitiveness, economic development, 
security, and rule of law. ENADE has made proposals to the gov-
ernment, but as the Guatemalan business community has pointed 
out, these proposals are often not fully endorsed by presidents 
or political parties.38  Another initiative of the business commu-
nity is “Businessmen for Education,” a campaign founded in 2002 
whose objective is to improve the quality of education in Guate-
mala. "ese initiatives show that the private sector’s involvement in 
policy issues has increased, although it remains outside the formal 
political arena.
By 2007, there was no major right wing party in Guatemala. 
PAN had disbanded, and its erstwhile leader Arzú founded the 
Unionista Party. GANA, which su!ered from schisms and internal 
division, came third in the elections, while FRG had a weak candi-
date in Luis Rabbé. "e election was won by Alvaro Colom of the 
National Unity for Hope party (UNE) over general Otto Perez 
Molina of the Patriota Party. Colom was a businessman who iden-
tified as a social democrat. His relationship with the private sector 
would be rocky in the years ahead. 
From the beginning of his administration, Colom attempted 
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to maintain strong ties with the private sector. His cabinet had few 
businessmen, but his private sector ties as a former member of the 
board of the Chamber of Industry and the Agro Exporter Asso-
ciation assured the private sector that he would respect the free 
market model. He was aware that any reforms in Guatemala had 
to be negotiated. He appointed Juan Alberto Fuentes Knight as 
his minister of finance, a believer in fiscal reform. Fuentes Knight 
claims that although he received the support of the president at 
first, Colom’s support declined as both external and internal pres-
sures on the government began to intensify. 39 Internally, Colom 
had to deal with the political ambitions of his wife, Sandra Torres, 
who implemented a series of social programs aimed at improving 
her image. Torres also attempted to set up the organizational ma-
chine needed for her own potential presidential bid in 2011.
Externally, the private sector was distrustful of Colom and his 
party, arguing that tax reform in the midst of economic crisis would 
harm the economy. "e private sector disliked Sandra Torres’ con-
trol of the government and demanded more transparency. Colom 
was a weak president and gave in to pressure from his wife and his 
close collaborators. He tried to negotiate the reform with mem-
bers of his own party, but they did not support it. When all else 
failed, Colom tried to gain the support of the Guatemalan teachers’ 
union. "is strategy also failed, and Colom ended his term without 
achieving the fiscal reform. "e lack of strong parties in Guatemala 
again explains the inability of government to rule e!ectively. "e 
private sector had maintained its influence, proving that it did not 
need a party to achieve its goals. 
Although the fiscal reform proposals did not generate pub-
lic confrontation between the private sector and the government, 
the assassination of lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg on May 10, 2009 
led to the worst polarization Guatemala has experienced in the 
last decade. In a video he recorded before his assassination, Ro-
drigo Rosenberg claimed that he was about to be killed by order 
of Colom, Torres, and Colom’s personal secretary. Rosenberg was 
the former lawyer of Khalil Musa, who had been assassinated in 
April. He argued that Musa had been killed to prevent him from 
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revealing corruption within ANACAFE, the organization of cof-
fee producers. Rosenberg’s death prompted university students to 
organize strikes and protests, in which they were joined by CACIF. 
Colom denied the accusations that Rosenberg made against 
him, asking the United Nations-sponsored International Com-
mission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to investigate 
the crime. According to CICIG’s findings, Colom had not been 
involved in Rosenberg’s death. "e private sector reacted to these 
findings with disbelief, arguing that corruption in the Colom gov-
ernment still needed to be investigated. 
A positive result of the Rosenberg crisis was the increased 
participation by civil society in public a!airs. In 2009, students 
and civil society organizations started project Guatemala Visible, 
which aims to make the justice system more transparent and open. 
Guatemala Visible received the support of FUNDESA and has 
influenced the election of magistrates for the Constitutional and 
Supreme Courts.40 Business leaders have also supported other 
e!orts, such as Guatemaltecos Mejoremos Guatemala (Let’s Im-
prove Guatemala), a project that focuses on economic and social 
development with special attention to transparency, employment, 
and security. Despite the many problems facing Guatemala, there 
is an increasing sense that civil society and especially the country’s 
youth are becoming more involved in political issues.
After the Rosenberg incident, the government’s relationship 
with the private sector remained fraught. Meanwhile, the Partido 
Patriota led an open battle against the ruling party, to justify block-
ing UNE’s legislative proposals by arguing that the party was in-
volved in clientelistic practices. "is legislative deadlock only con-
firmed the private sector’s decision to not o!er formal support for a 
political party in the 2011 election.  
In 2011, the rise of Manuel Baldizón, a UNE dissident, posed 
a threat to the private sector. Again, this threat came from a person-
alistic movement with no strong roots in society. Baldizon engaged 
the masses with populist rhetoric, promising the creation of a new 
bonus for workers, the dissolution of the national police, the cre-
ation of a national guard, and the instatement of the death penalty. 
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After Baldizón won second place in the first round of elections, the 
private sector began investing more resources in the campaign of 
Otto Perez Molina, his rival. In a close race, Otto Perez was elected 
president of Guatemala in November 2011. 
From the beginning, the private sector was optimistic that 
Otto Perez would deliver his promise on improving security in 
Guatemala. Fiscal reforms have been approved, despite criticism 
coming from left of center politicians. Although Otto Perez’s pro-
posal to reform the Constitution has not been supported by the 
private sector, the relationship between the private sector and the 
state has been calm.  Although the Partido Patriota holds the ma-
jority in Congress and has been able to build alliances during the 
first half of 2012, commentators expect that as elections approach, 
the political system will become more unstable and unpredictable. 
Rejecting the uncertainty associated with political parties, the pri-
vate sector has maintained its influence through other mechanisms. 
It does not seem that the private sector will fully support a political 
party in the near future. 
Conclusions
In this paper I have attempted to explain why the Guatema-
lan private sector has not become fully involved with a political 
party. I looked to a set of di!erent variables to address this ques-
tion. First, I observed the role of two factors identified by Edward 
Gibson: the fragmentation of the private sector and the access of 
the private sector to the government. When the private sector is 
fragmented, it will not support a political party. When the private 
sector has access to government, it will not support a political party. 
"e analysis of the private sector in Guatemala from 1944 to 2012 
shows that the Guatemalan private sector has remained cohesive 
over time. While there are di!erent sub-sectors within the business 
associations, the private sector has united in moments of di#culty. 
Yet this unity has never been translated into support for a politi-
cal party. "us, the first hypothesis does not explain the case of 
Guatemala. 
"e second variable, the access of private sector to govern-
ment, has played a clear role in Guatemala. From 1954 to 2012 the 
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private sector has enjoyed access to the executive through cabinet 
appointments, especially those with fiscal and economic portfolios. 
"ese appointments take place during the first year of the presi-
dent’s term. As the private sector’s relationship with the executive 
becomes more strained, some of these cabinet members may re-
sign. Recently, the private sector has not had as great a presence in 
cabinet, particularly during the Portillo and Colom governments. 
However, as a result, the private sector was able to make its influ-
ence felt through other means (i.e. business associations), thus con-
tributing to the shaping of the government agenda. 
In addition, I looked at threats to the private sector as incen-
tives to support a political party. I di!erentiated between two types 
of threats: armed threat and electoral threat. When the private sec-
tor faces a radical armed threat, it is less likely that they will cre-
ate linkages with a political party. In this case, they might invest 
resources in the armed struggle. When the threat comes from an 
institutionalized leftist party, it is more likely that the private sector 
will support a political party. "e case of Guatemala shows that in 
the absence of an electoral threat, the private sector has not devoted 
its resources to a particular party platform. 
"e left in Guatemala has not been a key player in elections 
since its re-introduction to the system. Although DCG, FRG and 
UNE have challenged the business community at various points, 
these parties were personalistic, lacking a long-term program and 
strong societal support, and were accused of corruption. After be-
ing in power, they virtually disappeared from the electoral map. 
"e private sector has not had to contend with a leftist party that is 
able to implement its program for more than one term.
 "erefore, I conclude that the lack of private sector support 
for political parties in Guatemala can be explained by the access to 
government policy, especially to the president and his cabinet, and 
the absence of an institutionalized party system featuring a strong 
leftist party that can motivate the private sector to invest in a con-
servative party. As long as parties remain relatively un-institution-
alized, the private sector will not feel confident enough to invest 
significant resources in a party platform. Instead, they will rely on 
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business associations to influence policy in a way that reflects their 
concerns. 
My theory on private sectors and political parties fits other 
cases in Latin America. For example, in Mexico, PAN gathered the 
support of medium and small sized entrepreneurs when these ac-
tors felt they were being excluded from the PRI government of the 
mid-1980s. In El Salvador, although many argue it was the guer-
rilla threat that led to the private sector supporting ARENA, the 
private sector became politically active when the DCG government 
excluded it from the decision-making process in the 1980s. "e 
Salvadorian private sector had lost its veto power and was not able 
to stand in the way of land reform and the nationalization of the 
banks. By the end of the 1980s, the guerilla threat had become an 
institutional electoral challenge with the transformation of FMLN 
into a political party. In Guatemala, even after the left returned to 
the electoral game, it was not been able to establish a project with 
strong popular support. In the case of El Salvador, FMLN has 
been the second most important electoral force in the country since 
1989, winning the presidency in 2009. Certainly, an important fac-
tor to consider in the case of El Salvador is that the left already 
had an electoral base before it allied itself with the guerrilla move-
ment. In Guatemala, however, the left was never a strong political 
option, and it was outside of the system during the period of mili-
tary rule. In El Salvador, a part of the left remained in the political 
game, which contributed to the left’s stronger societal appeal. Most 
importantly, the threat at the electoral level forced the Salvadorian 
business elites to invest in a political party.
 In the case of Argentina, the Peronist party has moved from 
labor-centered to neoliberal to social democrat. Because the private 
sector in Argentina is able to influence policy through a number of 
means, it has not invested major resources in building a political 
party. Finally, in Chile, the business sector faced the challenge of 
the leftist coalition Concertacion, which was in power for most of 
the democratic period. In order to have access to government, there 
was no other option but to support the other opposition party—
the Alianza por Chile. 
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"is analysis implies that the prospects for forming a busi-
ness-supported party in Guatemala are extremely low. "e degree 
of access to government has varied slightly according to the ideol-
ogy of the president at the time but remained mainly the same over 
time. Most importantly, the left does not seem to have any pros-
pects of revival in Guatemala, at least during the next decade or 
two. With a change in any of these two variables, the private sector 
will be forced to become fully involved in electoral politics. As long 
as the costs of investing in a political party are higher than those of 
investing in business associations, the private sector will stay away 
from political parties. Hopefully, the private sector’s new interest 
in developing long term policies through FUNDESA and other 
think tanks will be translated into action, improving the lives of all 
Guatemalans.
To view all charts and tables, visit:
http://www.helvidius.org/2012/lemus
Endnotes
1  I want to thank professors Rachel McCleary, Jorge I. Dominguez, and Steve 
Levitsky for their advice and contributions to my research. Also, special thanks to Juan Luis 
Bosch, Peter Lamport, Max Quirin, and Salvador Paiz for their valuable perspectives on my 
topic. 
2   Edward Gibson, Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative 
Perspective, (Baltimore Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1996) 7
3   Kevin Middlebrook, ed. Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin 
America, (Baltimore, Maryland: "e Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
4   Yemile Mizrahi, From Martydordom to Power: "e Partido De Accion Nacional in 
Mexico, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). 
5   Juan Pablo Luna, “Segmented Party-Voter Linkages in Latin America: "e Case of 
the UDI”. Journal of Latin American Studies (2010).
6   Rachel McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent 
Revolution, (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1999).
7   Richards Adams, Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social 
Structure 1944-1966, (San Antonio TX: University of Texas, 1970).
8   Paul Dosal. Power in Transition: "e Rise of Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy, 
1871-1994. (Westpower CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995). 
9   Marta Casaus Arzú. Guatemala: Linaje y Racismo, (Guatemala: F&G Editores, 
2007).
10   Ulrike Joras,  Companies in Peace Processes: A Guatemalan Case Study. 
(Majuskel Medienproduktion GmbH, Wetzlar, 2007).
11   Interview with Max Quirin November 16,2011; Interview with Salvador Paiz 
November 21,2011; Interview with Juan Luis Bosch, November 29 2011; Interview with Peter 
215Journal of Politics & Society
Lamport December 2, 2011.
12   Mario Payeras, El Trueno en la Ciudad: Episodios de la Lucha Armada Urbana de 
1981 en Guatemala,  (Mexico: Juan Pablos, Editores, S.A. 1987).
13   Notice that the y-axis depicts the support of the private sector to any party; 
however, because of programmatic linkages, it is more likely that the support would go to a 
right wing party.
14   Dan Slater, Ordering Power : Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans 
in Southeast Asia (Cambridge ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
15   McCleary, Dictating Democracy, p. 135.
16   Dosal, Power in Transition, p. 114.
17   Carlos Montenegro Rios, Historia De Los Partidos Politicos En Guatemala. 
(2002).
18   Dosal, Power in Transition, p. 131.
19   Fernando Valdez and Mayra Palencia, Los Dominios Del Poder: La Encrucijada 
Tributaria. (Guatemala City: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1998), p. 48.
20   McCleary, Dictating Democracy, p. 45.
21   Salvadorean Foundation for Social and Economic Development (FUSADES) 
was founded in 1983 by a group of independent businessmen. "eir objective was to influence 
policies to promote economic growth and social  development (See FUSADES website).
22   McCleary, Dictating Democracy, p. 57.
23   "e Christian Democrat Party of Guatemala was founded in 1955. It emerged as 
a right of center party with links to international Christian democrats organizations. In 1974, 
they presented Efrain Rios Montt as the candidate for the presidency. Although he won this 
election, the military performed electoral fraud. Later, the DCG would strengthen its links 
with social movements in Guatemala, especially with labor unions and student movements.
24   Despite coming from a traditional family, Rodolfo Paiz went against the interest 
of the organized private sector. "ey even asked for his resignation (Valdez and Palencia, 1998)
25   Valdez and Palencia, Los Dominios del Poder, pp. 134–135.
26   Valdez and Palencia, Los Dominios del Poder, pp. 148–153.
27   Valdez and Palencia, Los Dominios del Poder, p. 175.
28   McCleary, Dictating Democracy, p. 137.
29   McCleary, Dictating Democracy, p. 139
30   McCleary, Dictating Democracy, p. 135
31   Interview with Juan Luis Bosch, November 29 2011
32   Valdez and Palencia, Los Dominios del Poder, p. 363
33   Interview with Max Quirin, November 16, 2011.
34   Interview with Max Quirin, November 16, 2011.
35   Dinorah Azpuru, Juan Pablo Pira, and Mitchell Seligson, Cultura Politica De 
La Democracia Guatemalteca: 2006. (Guatemala City: Vanderbilt University-ASIES,2006),  
p.133
36   Interview with Peter Lamport, December 2, 2011.
37   Interview with Juan Luis Bosch, November 29, 2011.
38   Interview with Salvador Paiz, November 21, 2011.
39   Juan Alberto Fuentes Knight. Rendicion de Cuentas. (Guatemala City: F&G 
Editores, 2011).
40   Interview with Salvador Paiz, November 21, 2011.
Bibliography
Adams, Richards. Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social 
216 0IQYW4VMZEXI7IGXSVERH4SPMXMGEP4EVXMIW
Structure 1944-1966. San Antonio TX: University of Texas, 1970. Print. 
Aldrich, John Herbert, 1947-. Why Parties? : "e Origin and Transformation of 
Political Parties in America. Chicago: "e University of Chicago Press, 1995. Print. 
Anderson, Charles. “Central American Political Parties: A Functional Approach.” "e 
Western Political Quarterly 15.1 (1962): 125-139. 
Asociacion de Investigacion y Estudios Sociales. La Cultura Democratica De Los 
Guatemaltecos. Guatemala City: ASIES, 1995. Print. 
---. Diagnostico Del Funcionamiento Del Sistema De Partidos Politicos En Guatemala. 
Guatemala City: ASIES, 2002. Print. 
---. En El Proceso De Elecciones 1990-1991. Guatemala City: ASIES, 1991. Print. 
---. Gobernabilidad Democratica y Reformas De Segunda Generacion a La Ley 
Electoral y De Partidos Politicos. Guatemala City: ASIES, 2004. Print. 
---. Guatemala: Monografia De Los Partidos Politicos 2000-2004. Guatemala City: 
ASIES, 2004. Print. 
---. Guatemala: Monografia De Los Partidos Politicos 2004-2007. Guatemala City: 
ASIES, 2004. Print.
---. La Institucionalizacion Del Sistema De Partidos Politicos En Guatemala: Desafios 
y Oportunidades. Guatemala City: ASIES, 2000. Print. 
---. Partidos Politicos y Plataformas Programaticas: El Dilema Etico De Las Ofertas 
Electorales. Guatemala City: ASIES, 2002. Print. 
---. Reconversion De Los Partidos: Su Reto Ante La Crisis. Guatemala City: ASIES, 
1994. Print. 
---. Reformas a La Ley Electoral y Desarrollo Institucional De Los Partidos Politicos 
En Guatemala. Guatemala City: ASIES, 2008. Print. 
---. Representatividad e Intermediacion De Las Organizaciones Politicas. Guatemala 
City: ASIES, 1998. Print. 
---. Responsabilidad De Los Partidos Politicos y Del Liderazgo Emergente En La 
Consolidacion Del Sistema Democrático. Guatemala City: ASIES, 2001. Print. 
---. Sistema De Partidos Politicos De Guatemala a 20 Años De La Ley Electoral y De 
Partidos Politicos. Guatemala City: ASIES, 2005. Print. 
---. Los Sistema De Partidos Politicos En Centro America y Las Perspectivas De Los 
Procesos De Democratizacion. Guatemala City: ASIES, 1986. Print. 
Azpuru, Dinorah, Juan Pablo Pira, and Mitchell Seligson. Cultura Politica De La 
Democracia En Guatemala, 2010: Consolidacion Democratica En Las Americas En Tiempos 
Dificiles. Vanderbilt University, ASIES, 2010. Print. 
--- Azpuru, Dinorah, Juan Pablo Pira, and Mitchell Seligson. “Cultura Politica De La 
Democracia Guatemalteca: 2006.” Vanderbilt University, ASIES,2006. Print. 
Ball, Patrick (Patrick Donnell), Paul Kobrak, and Herbert F. Spirer. State Violence in 
Guatemala, 1960-1996 : A Quantitative Reflection. Washington, DC: American Association 
for the Advancement of Science, 1999. 
Booth, John, and Patricia Bayer Richard. “Civil Society, Political Capital, and 
Democratization in Central America.” "e Journal of Politics 60.3 (1998): 780-800. 
Booth, John. “A Guatemalan Nightmare: Levels of Political Violence, 1966-1972.” 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World A!airs 22.2 (1980) 
Bornschein, Dirk. Las Izquierdas En Guatemala: Reflejos De Un Futuro Incierto. 
2000: Fundacion Friedrich Ebert, 2000. Print. 
Campang Chang, Jose. El Estado y Los Partidos Politicos En Guatemala, 1944-1951. 
Guatemala City: Fotograbado Llerena, S.A, 1992. Print. 
Casaus Arzú, Marta. Guatemala: Linaje y Racismo. Guatemala: F&G Editores, 2007. 
Print. 
Cerigua. Oscar Berger Perdomo presenta a su gabinete. Retrieved Dec 11, 2011. 
217Journal of Politics & Society
http://derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/berger1.html
Chalmers, Douglas, Campello de Souza, Maria do Carmo, and Atilio Boron, eds. "e 
Right and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992. Print. 
Colburn, Forrest, and Fernando Sanchez. Individuos Versus Instituciones En Las 
Democracia Centroamericanas. San Jose Costa Rica: EDUCA, 2001. Print. 
Dargent, E. and Muñoz, P. “Democracy against Parties?  Party System De-
Institutionalization in Colombia.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 2 (2011): pp. 43-71. 
Dix, R.H., “Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America,” Comparative 
Politics 22, No. 1 (October 1989): 23-37.
1 Dosal, Paul. Power in Transition: "e Rise of Guatemala’s Industrial Oligarchy, 
1871-1994. Westpower CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995. Print. 
Frundt, Henry. “Guatemala in Search of Democracy.” Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World A!airs 32.3 (1990): 24-74. Print. 
Fuentes Knight, Juan Alberto. Rendicion de Cuentas. Guatemala City: F&G Editores, 
2011. Print.
Gibson, Edward. Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative 
Perspective. Baltimore Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1996. Print. 
Gramajo Morales, Hector. “Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990: A 
Perspective from Inside Guatemala’s Army.” Democratic Transitions in Central America. Eds. 
Jorge Dominguez and Marc Lindenberg. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997. 
111. Print. 
Hagopian, Frances, and Scott Mainwaring, eds. "e "ird Wave of Democratization in 
Latin America: Advances and Setbacks. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Print. 
Hernández, Lucrecia, Alfredo Burgos, and Myrna Mack Fundación. Los Partidos 
Políticos En Guatemala. 1.th ed. Ciudad de Guatemala, Guatemala, C.A.: Fundación Myrna 
Mack, 1999. Print. 
Holiday, David. “Guatemala’s Long Run to Peace.” Current History (1997) 
Huntington, Samuel. "e "ird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century. University of Oklahoma Press (1993). Print
Inforpress Centroamericana. Guatemala, Elecciones 1995. Guatemala City: Inforpress 
Centroamericana, 1995. Print. 
Inforpress Centroamericana. Central American Report. 2000-2010
Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Politicos. Guatemala: Elecciones Generales 
1995. Guatemala: INCEP, 1995. Print. 
Johson, Kenneth. “"e 1966 and 1970 Elections in Guatemala: A Comparative 
Analysis.” World A!airs 134.1 (1971): 34-50. Print. 
Joras, Ulrike. Companies in Peace Processes: A Guatemalan Case Study. Majuskel 
Medienproduktion GmbH, Wetzlar, 2007. Print. 
Kitschelt, Herbert. "e Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and 
Germany. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989. Print. 
Lapola, Gustavo, and (Organization) CONADEHGUA. El Emporio De Los 
Militares. Guatemala: CONADEHGUA, 2003. Print. 
Luján Muñoz, Jorge. Los Partidos Políticos En Guatemala Desde La Independencia 
Hasta El Fin De La Federación. Guatemala?: s.n.] ;, 1989. Print. 
Luna, Juan Pablo. “Segmented Party-Voter Linkages in Latin America: "e Case of the 
UDI”. Journal of Latin American Studies. 2010
Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T., “Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America.” In 
Mainwaring and Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin 
America. Stanford University Press, 1995.
McCleary, Rachel. Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent 
218 0IQYW4VMZEXI7IGXSVERH4SPMXMGEP4EVXMIW
Revolution. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1999. Print. 
Middlebrook, Kevin, ed. Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin 
America. Baltimore, Maryland: "e Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Print. 
Mizrahi, Yemile. From Martydordom to Power: "e Partido De Accion Nacional in 
Mexico. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. Print. 
---. Recasting Business-Government Relations in Mexico: "e Emergence of Panista 
Entrepreneurs. Mexico D.F: CIDE, 1997. Print. 
Montenegro Rios, Carlos. “Historia De Los Partidos Politicos En Guatemala.” (2002)
Print. 
Ortiz Loaiza, Paola, et al, eds. Partidos Politicos En Guatemala: Entre 
Instituticionalidad y Pragmatismo Politico. Guatemala City: FLACSO, 2008. Print. 
Painter, James. “Guatemala in Civilian Garb.” "ird World Quarterly 8.3 (1986): 818-
844. Print. 
---. Guatemala: False Hope, False Freedom, the Rich, the Poor and the Christian 
Democrats. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1987. Print. 
Paiz-Andrade, Rodolfo. “Guatemala 1978-1992: "e Incomplete Process of the 
Transition to Democracy.” Democratic Transitions in Central America. Eds. Jorge Dominguez 
and Marc Lindenberg. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997. Print. 
Partido de, Avanzada Nacional. Propuesta De Acción Gubernamental Para El 
Período 2000-2004 : Una Guatemala Que Nos Incluya a Todos, Una Guatemala En La Que 
Progresemos Todos. Guatemala: El Partido, 1999. Print. 
Payeras Mario, El Trueno en la Ciudad: Episodios de la Lucha Armada Urbana de 
1981 en Guatemala.  Mexico, Juan Pablos, Editores, S.A. 1987. Print
“Phone Interview with Juan Luis Bosch, November 29, 2011.” 
“Phone Interview with Max Quirin, November 16, 2011.”  
“Phone Interview with Peter Lamport, December 2, 2011.” 
“Phone Interview with Salvador Paiz, November 21, 2011.”
Poitevin, René. El Proceso De Industrialización En Guatemala. 1.th ed. Ciudad 
Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1977. Print. 
Rodriguez de Ita, Guadalupe. Participacion Politica En La Primavera Guatemalteca: 
Una Aproximacion a La Historia De Los Partidos Durante El Periodo 1944-1954. Mexico 
D.F: Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Mexico, 2003. Print. 
Ruhl, Mark. “Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords: "e Fate of Reform Under 
Arzú and Portillo.” Latin American Politics and Society 47.1 (2005): 55-85.  
Sanchez, Omar. “Guatemala’s Party Universe: A Case of Deinstitutionalization.” Latin 
American Politics and Society 50.1 (2008): 123-151. Print. 
Serrano Elías, Jorge. El Militarismo y La Democratización. 3 Vol. Guatemala: 
Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales, 1991. Print. 
Sichar Moreno, Gonzalo. Historia De Los Partidos Politicos Guatemaltecos. 
Quetzaltenango: Editorial Los Altos, 1999. Print. 
Slater, Dan. Ordering Power : Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in 
Southeast Asia. Cambridge;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print. 
Solorzano Martinez, Mario. Guatemala: Autoritarismo y Democracia. Guatemala 
City: FLACSO, 1987. Print. 
Valdez, Fernando, and Mayra Palencia. Los Dominios Del Poder: La Encrucijada 
Tributaria. Guatemala City: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1998. Print. 
Valdez, Fernando. La Fascinacion Por La Moncloa: Del Pacto Entre Elites Al Acuerdo 
Social. Guatemala City: Universidad Rafael Landivar, 2009. Print. 
---. El Ocaso De Un Liderazgo: Las Elites Empresariales Tras Un Nuevo 
Protagonismo. Guatemala City: FLACSO, 2003. Print. 
